hief Justice Reynato Puno
should have rejected the creation of the Judicial-Exe-cutive-Legislative
Advisory and Legislative Council. While it may be true that consultations
between the three branches of government are unlikely to endanger the
independence of the judiciary, especially with Puno at the helm, the JEDAC
unnecessarily creates doubts in the citizens’ minds.
The Supreme Court decision on the Neri case upholding
executive privilege remains fresh in the people’s mind. In fact, it is currently
the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The vote was 9-6, with most of
Gloria Arroyo’s latest appointees joining the majority. The ruling was seen as
having split the tribunal into pro-and anti-Gloria blocs. The perception may
have no relationship with reality, but the damage to the credibility of the high
court has been done.
The formation of JEDAC can only reinforce the perception of
the judiciary’s politicalization.
The JEDAC is patterned after the Legislative-Executive
Development Advisory Council. The latter was created to ensure cooperation on
priority policies and programs. It was intended as the solution to recurrent
deadlocks between the executive and the legislative.
The difference here is that LEDAC is composed of the
political branches of government. The legislative and the executive pursue
divergent agenda, which for the most part are set by different political visions
and programs. Resolution of their differences demands accommodation, which is a
fundamental principle in politics. Give-and-take is a given.
In the case of the judiciary, accommodation is not in its
vocabulary. On the contrary, inflexible adherence to the laws and jurisprudence
is the rule. There is no room for bargaining in the courts.
The mandate of the JEDAC, according to the Palace "is to
identify and solve the problems affecting the rule of law, the budget of the
judiciary, its infrastructure requirements, creation of new positions and
filling of vacancies, career development program, compensation and security of
judicial officials, security of tenure and other related matters."
Except for that catch-all phrase "problems affecting the rule
of law," the mandated tasks of the JEDAC are all administrative. Issues relating
to these tasks can be resolved in a forum similar to the congressional budget
hearings. The difference, of course, is that the tribunal, in theory, enjoys
fiscal autonomy and the chief justice cannot be called to appear before any
legislative body save in the case of impeachment.
We qualified the constitutional provision on the judiciary’s
fiscal autonomy with the phrase "in theory," for here is where the problem lies.
Everybody meddles with the judiciary.
"Isolation" of the judiciary is not and never has been an issue. Its
independence is. If the political branches simply leave the judiciary well
alone, then there’s no need for the JEDAC or any other
consultative/advisory/coordinating body.
